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Abstract
Findings from behavioural research are gaining increased interest in EU legislation,
specifically in the area of unfair commercial practices. Prior research on the Mars case
(Purnhagen and van Herpen 2017) has left open whether empirical evidence can provide
an indication that this practice of using oversized indications of additional volume alters
the transactional decision of consumers. This, however, is required to determine the
“misleadingness” of such a practice in the legal sense as stipulated by the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC. The current paper closes this gap by
illustrating how behavioural research can inform legal interpretation. In particular, it
extends the previous research in two important ways: first, by examining the actual
choice that people make; and second, by investigating whether the effects remain present
in a context where a comparison product is available. Yet, while supporting and extend-
ing the findings of the study from Purnhagen and van Herpen (2017) on deceptiveness,
the current study could not produce empirical evidence of a clear influence on the
transactional decision of consumers, in the way “UCPD” requires.
Keywords Unfair commercial practices . Average consumer . Consumer behaviour . Anchoring
bias
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-021-09490-4








Extended author information available on the last page of the article
Published online: 21 May 2021
Journal of Consumer Policy (2021) 44:385–406
Findings from behavioural research are gaining increased interest in unfair commercial practices
(Duivenvoorde, 2015; Purnhagen, 2017; Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017; Schebesta &
Purnhagen, 2017; Sibony, 2015; Trzaskowki, 2011; Weatherill, 2007). The European Commis-
sion, for example, funded a study where behavioural scientists tested whether behavioural science
methods could be utilised to determine “vulnerability” when interpreting the legal “average
consumer benchmark” within the specific group of vulnerable consumers (European
Commission, 2016a). The European Commission took up these findings in its guidance document
on the interpretation of the average consumer benchmark in EU Unfair Commercial Practices law
(European Commission, 2016b, critical Purnhagen, 2018). Likewise, the Court of Justice of the
European Union1 presents an interpretation of legal norms that parallels the outcome from
behavioural studies (Schebesta& Purnhagen, 2016). Seldom, however, has research of behavioural
science directly targeted the interpretation of legal norms in European Union law. To illustrate this
potential of behavioural research for the interpretation of unfair commercial practices, the norma-
tive assumptions of the influential Mars case (1995)2 concerning misleading advertisement on a
food package have been examined in an experiment simulating deceptiveness in terms of product
perceptions (Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017). The Mars case (1995) concerned a business
practice where theMars company attached a “10%more” label on an ice-cream bar sold in Europe
which in fact contains 10%more content for the same price. The yellow area of the label, however,
covered 30% of the pack. The Mars case (1995) hence concerns a situation in which a product
package contains extra volume (“bonus pack”), and where a coloured area on the pack commu-
nicates that the product is larger than usual. This coloured area is larger than the actual additional
volume contained in the package, and the question is whether this ismisleading in the legal sense as
stipulated by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC (hereafter: the UCPD).3
In their study, Purnhagen and van Herpen (2017) provided first evidence, in an experimental
setting, that such bonus packs containing an oversized indication of the extra volume on the
package systematically lead consumers to overestimate the actual extra volume given and, as a
result, could potentially bemisleading. If one, as some scholars (Purnhagen, 2017; Sibony, 2015;
Trzaskowki, 2011) and the European Commission (2016b) propose, were to use evidence from
such studies as a basis to determine if consumers are deceived in the sense of the law, this study
has illustrated that consumers are indeed likely to be deceived. These findings contradicted the
Court’s findings in the original Mars case (1995). It was left open, however, if such deceptive-
ness would also influence the consumer’s buying behaviour. To use the terminology of the
UCPD,whether this deceptiveness causes the average consumer or is likely to cause him “to take
a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise” (Art. 6 UCPD).
The current study will fill this void in knowledge by providing empirical evidence on whether
bonus packs with oversized volume indications will not only affect consumer perceptions but
also the actual choices that theymake. Our study alsomakes an important additional contribution
beyond the prior empirical examination of Purnhagen and van Herpen (2017). Not only it will
examine consumer choices but it will do so in a setting in which a competing alternative product
is available that should make misleading on-pack information more obvious. After all,
1 We refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union as “CJEU” and to the CJEU and the European Court of
Justice as “the Court.”
2 Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen In Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v. Mars GmbH, EU:C:1995:224.
3 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC,
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation
(EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive).
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consumers regularly make transactional decisions in a setting where multiple products are
offered simultaneously. They may notice that the extra volume indication on a bonus pack
is misleading when a product of the same size but without the extra volume is
presented next to it. Thus, one might expect that a side-by-side comparison of bonus
and regular products will mitigate the effects of misleading information and prevent
consumers from being deceived.
Our results will show that oversized area indications are deceptive, even when products are
presented side-by-side and observation of the actual extra volume is made relatively easy.
Consumers in this situation still believe that more extra volume is provided than is actually the
case. Interestingly, however, the purchase intention for the bonus product did not depend on
whether an oversized area was present or not. Our experimental findings thus suggest that, for
stating their purchase intentions, it was irrelevant to consumers whether the pack contained an
oversized or correct indication area. Instead, when both bonus and comparison product were
evaluated together, consumers indicated a higher purchase intention for the bonus product than
for the comparison product. They apparently preferred the bonus product irrespective of how
much bonus volume they perceived it to obtain. It seems that in a competitive choice setting,
the availability of a comparison product made the extra volume salient. Moreover, we find
little evidence to suggest that actual choices are affected.
To sum up, while supporting and extending the findings of the study from Purnhagen and
van Herpen (2017) on deceptiveness, the current study could not produce empirical evidence
of a clear influence on the transactional decision of consumers, in the way UCPD requires.
The current study demonstrates how experimental evidence can inform legal cases involv-
ing potential misleading graphical indications on product packaging. Its main aim is to
showcase how such an experiment can be set up, which insights can be gained, and what
their relevance is for the legal issue. Our choice for a lab experiment is based on its unique
ability to provide causal evidence under controlled circumstances. To inform the legal case, it
is pertinent that effects can be exclusively attributed to the graphical information on pack and
not to other circumstances or marketing tactics. Although a lab experiment is tailored to this,
the results from such a lab experiment can be meaningfully supplemented with insights gained
from qualitative work (to assess consumer responses more in-depth) and real-world transac-
tional (sales) data (to obtain an indication of the size of the effect in real life). This will be
discussed further in the general discussion.
Obviously, one experiment cannot provide a conclusive answer that would hold for all
cases involving oversized area indications on bonus packs. Although we expect results to be
generalizable, more research will be needed to determine if similar effects are found across
demographic groups, different countries, and cultures, and for various product categories. Our
objective is thus to provide first evidence for the effect that oversized area indications on bonus
packs may have on consumers’ transactional decisions.
Taking the demands for regulatory validity (Purnhagen, 2018) when applying experimental
research to legal questions seriously, we will first present the legal framework of EU Unfair
Commercial Practices law on which our hypothesis and the design of the study is based.
Subsequently, drawing upon studies of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics on
biases in consumer decision-making, we will develop hypotheses regarding the expected
effects of oversized volume areas on consumer perceptions and choice. We will then present
the experiment and its results. Finally, we will put the results into the wider context and discuss
whether we can draw normative conclusions for legal interpretation from this experiment and,
if so, which ones.
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The Legal Framework of Unfair Commercial Practices in Foods
The protection of consumers against misleading practices is one of the quintessential functions
of the European information model and constitutes an important part of the UCPD
(Straetmans, 2016). In the area of food, Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 covers such unfair
commercial practices on the provision of food information to consumers (hereafter FIC).4 The
basic principles are that food information may not be misleading and that information must be
accurate, clear, and easy to understand for the consumer (Art. 7 (1), (2) FIC). Although the FIC
provisions echo the general spirit of the UCPD, they lack its more elaborated tests (Schebesta,
2019). Unlike Art. 6(1) UCPD, Article 7 of the FIC does not explicitly require a causal link
between a deceiving practice and an alteration in consumer’s purchase behaviour as a result of
that deceptiveness to qualify a practice as misleading (Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017; Van
der Zee & Fisher, 2018). Whether the differing test in Article 7 FIC can be considered lex
specialis to the UCPD and hence preclude the applicability of the UCPD’s additional require-
ment of a causal link, or whether Article 7 FIC can be seen as a declaratory repetition of the
UCPD’s requirements, is not clear from the text. The relationship between both provisions
hence needs clarification.
Article 7 FIC qualifies as a rule “regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices”
and shall hence “prevail and apply to those specific aspects” (Art. 3(4) UCPD). As a result, the
law mandates that the rules of the FIC generally prevail over the ones of the UCPD. The FIC
stipulates positive objective unilateral requirements such as standard information that needs to
be included and references the average consumer in this respect (see for this difference and the
different functions of the average consumer resulting from this Schebesta & Purnhagen, 2020,
p. 299). The UCPD uses the average consumer concept in many ways, including as a
benchmark to describe specific behaviour in concrete bilateral situations. Article 7 FIC can
qualify as an additional, mandatory indication to determine “deceptiveness” in the sense of the
UCPD, emphasizing that the speciality of foods when compared to other commodities
(Purnhagen & Wesseler, 2020) needs to be considered. This adds an additional, food-related
layer to the deceptiveness test of the UCPD, which justifies the application of both provisions
in parallel, the UCPD as a basis and the FIC in addition. Hence, adopting the terminology used
in the UCPD, the term “misleading” in Art. 7 FIC should rather read as “deceptive.” This result
is in line with findings in the literature, which stipulates that the provisions of the
UCPD remain applicable also to the area of foods if they do not contradict the
provisions of the FIC (Van der Zee & Fisher, 2018). This applies to the requirement
to determine whether the deceptiveness was likely to cause the consumer “to take a
transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise,” as this requirement is
not mentioned in Art. 7 FIC (Van der Zee & Fisher, 2018). For the purposes of our
study, we will hence rely solely on the provisions of the UCPD.
In order to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to achieve a high
level of consumer protection, the UCPD covers all business-to-consumer commercial practices
in all sectors of economic activity (Van Boom, 2016) before, during, and after a commercial
4 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the
provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006
of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council
Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No
608/2004, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 18–63.
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transaction in relation to a product (Art. 3 (1) UCPD). More specifically, the core of the UCPD
lies in the prohibition of practices that are contrary to the requirements of professional
diligence and that materially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour
of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed (Art. 5 (2) UCPD). Then,
the concept of “unfair practices” is further subcategorized into misleading and aggressive
practices (Arts. 6–9 UCPD).
As to the first category, a practice shall be regarded as misleading if “it contains false
information and is therefore untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives
or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct, in
relation to one or more of the listed elements, and, in either case, causes or is likely to cause
him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise” (Art. 6 (1)
UCPD). Therefore, in order for the abovementioned oversized volume indication areas to be
found a misleading commercial practice, they must impact on the transactional decision of
consumers. This facet has so far been left untested (Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017). It is the
aim of this study to investigate, within the confines of the methodology applied, whether the
deceptiveness of the practice alters consumer’s purchase decisions, which leads to the “mis-
leading character” of such a practice.
While for some time it had been contended that the requirement to prove a causal link
between deceptiveness and the transactional decision of the consumer did in practice not
provide an additional threshold, recent cases have increasingly emphasized this requirement
(Schebesta & Purnhagen, 2020, p. 303). The UCPD explicitly stipulates the notion of the
“average consumer” as a benchmark for assessing the deceptiveness of a commercial practice.
Consequentially, it is a settled case law that the average consumer concept provides a yardstick
by which to characterise a practice as deceptive (Schebesta & Purnhagen, 2019). Specifically,
in the words of the Court: “the constituent features of a misleading commercial practice, as set
out in that provision, are in essence expressed with reference to the consumer as the person to
whom unfair commercial practices are applied.”5 However, it was unclear if the same “average
consumer” yardstick would also need to be applied to determine whether the deceptiveness of
the practice would causally influence the transactional decision of the consumer. A transac-
tional decision describes “any decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how, and on
what terms to purchase, make payment in whole or in part for, retain or dispose of a product or
to exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides to act or
to refrain from acting.”6 The notion of transactional decisions covers concrete, bilateral
situations, and these are context depended on the individual case. This contrasts with the often
general, unilateral situations, which determine deceptiveness, and which often concern gener-
alizable situations, independent from the concrete case of the transaction.7 It had been unclear
if the same “average consumer” yardstick which applies to the determination of “deceptive-
ness” is applied also to determine the requirement of a causal link to the transactional decision.
The Court has clarified this question in Canal Digital Danmark A/S (2016).8 The case
5 Case C-435/11, CHS Tour Services GmbH v Team4 Travel GmbH, EU:C:2013:574 (para 43); Case C-611/14,
Canal Digital Danmark, EU:C:2016:800 (para 29); Case C-122/10, Konsumentombudsmannen v Ving Sverige
AB, EU:C:2011:299 (para 22-23).
6 Art. 2(k) of the UCPD.
7 In the Court’s case law, “deceptiveness” also describes context-dependent situations such as the one in Case
C-54/17 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. Wind Tre SpA EU:C:2018:710, para. 52.
8 Case C-611/14 Canal Digital Danmark A/S, EU:C:2016:800.
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concerned Canal Digital’s price advertising campaign for TV subscriptions. The CJEU held
that “where the price of a product is split into several components, one of which is particularly
emphasized in the marketing, while the other—which nevertheless constitutes an inevitable
and foreseeable element of the price—is completely omitted or is presented less conspicuous-
ly, an assessment should be made whether that presentation is likely to lead to a mistaken
perception of the overall offer” (CJEU, Canal Digital, para 43) and, furthermore, whether it
affects the transactional decision of the consumer (CJEU, Canal Digital, para 45). By means of
this decision, the CJEU used the average consumer benchmark as a basis for the interpretation
of the notion of a “transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise,” to our
knowledge, for the first time (Verbiest, 2017). In particular, the Court held that price “is, in
principle, a determining factor in the mind of the average consumer, when he has to make a
transactional decision” (Canal Digital, para 46). Therefore, the price enjoys an a priori
presumption of influencing the average consumer’s behaviour with respect to its transactional
decision (Schebesta & Purnhagen, 2019).
To this aim, according to both, legal requirements and “good scientific practice” of
consumer decision theory, a study focusing on the transactional decision is necessary. Prior
research (Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017) has left open whether empirical evidence can
provide an indication that the deceptive practice alters the transactional decision of consumers
to determine the “misleading character” of such a practice. The current paper closes this gap by
illustrating how behavioural research can be used as a tool to inform legal interpretation. In
particular, it extends the previous research in two important ways: first, by examining the
actual choice that people make; second, by investigating whether the effects remain present in
a context where a comparison product is available.
Oversized Volume Indications
In this section, taking inspiration from the findings of cognitive psychology (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) and law and behavioural science (Jolls et al., 1998; Sunstein, 2000), we
provide a brief overview of existing literature on consumer information processing that is
relevant for the Mars case (1995). Finally, we discuss how different evaluation contexts can
affect the consumer choice and may mitigate the effects that we expect.
Consumer Information Processing
The leitbild of the “sovereign consumer” (Reisch & Zhao, 2017), based on the traditional
assumptions of rationality and information (Incardona & Poncibò, 2007), has been increas-
ingly questioned. It has been shown that consumers are unable to process all the available
information because of their innate “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955). That is why they
often rely on a range of decision-making shortcuts, known as heuristics, and are strongly
dependent on the context in which the decision is made (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; for an
overview, Korobkin & Ulen, 2000). The term “heuristic” was coined by George Pólya (1945).
Heuristics, or rules of thumb, are mental shortcuts in decision-making, which allow individuals
to come to decisions quickly, but they can lead to biases.
Different models of decision-making have been developed, which altered, although
without completely departing from, the traditional assumptions of the “homo
economicus.” In persuasive communication, the elaboration likelihood model (ELM)
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has been popular (Perloff, 1993). The ELM states that there are two processing “routes to
persuasion,” each characterized by a different likelihood of elaboration, namely the
central and peripheral routes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). While the first requires an
extensive cognitive elaboration, the latter occurs when the motivation or ability to
elaborate is relatively low and individuals rely upon a series of peripheral cues in their
response to the message (Gabbott & Clulow, 1999). Subsequently, dual-system theories
were introduced, according to which there are two systems by which individuals process
information: an intuitive mode, called “system 1,” and a reasoning one, “system 2.” In
the former mode, individuals make fast, automatic, and effortless decisions based on
limited information and using a variety of heuristics, while the latter mode seems very
close to traditional assumptions of rational decision-making (Kahneman, 2003). Impor-
tantly, regardless of which model consumers are said to employ, they cannot avoid being
subject to a host of cognitive biases in their decision-making process, as reported in
behavioural literature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Numerical Versus Visual Information
Prior research has viewed the Mars case (1995) from an anchoring perspective (Purnhagen &
Van Herpen, 2017). The anchoring bias is one of the first biases uncovered in psychology
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), which has gained widespread recognition in judgement and
decision-making literature by the influential work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Accord-
ing to them, the anchoring bias entails consumers making estimates which are biased towards
an initially presented value (“the anchor”) from which they adjusted. Therefore, different
starting points can provide different estimates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The final
judgement is, then, a result of adjustments relative to this anchor, or reference point (Van
Exel et al., 2006). Following Tversky and Kahneman’s research, many studies illustrated the
influence of anchoring in human decision-making processes across various domains, including
the legal one (Van Exel 2006; Furnham & Boo, 2011).
Anchors may also occur across modalities and dimensions (Oppenheimer et al., 2008).
They may, for instance, activate a sense of size, that is not attached to any rating scale, and
may thus bias subsequent judgements (Le Boeuf & Shafir, 2006; Oppenheimer et al., 2008). In
the Mars case (1995), for instance, when people are confronted with the bonus pack, they are
biased in their estimates of values because a sense of size has been activated (Purnhagen &
Van Herpen, 2017).
In theMars case (1995), both a coloured section on the package and a numerical percentage
of extra volume are provided on-pack. These could both be seen as potential anchors
(Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017), or could be seen as pieces of information that consumers
can rely upon when forming their product evaluations (cf. information integration theory;
Lynch Jr, 1985). Regardless of which perspective is taken, there is overall consensus that
numerical information is likely to have less influence on product evaluations than visual
information. While the percentage of extra volume is numerical and is likely to require more
cognitive processing to be made meaningful for consumers, the coloured area can be processed
more easily as it directly indicates a part of the packaging. In this context, consumers have also
been shown to have difficulties in processing numeric information such as percentages (Chen
& Rao, 2007), which leads them to neglect base values, and prefer bonus packs over
economically equivalent price promotions (Chen et al., 2012). Moreover, the coloured area
is more visually salient than the numerical information. Based on these arguments, we expect
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that consumers will be more susceptible to influences of a coloured area on the pack and, thus,
will base their transactional decision on this:
H1:The presence (vs. absence) of an oversized volume indication on a bonus pack will
lead consumers to perceive that this product has a larger additional volume.
H2:The presence (vs. absence) of an oversized volume indication on a bonus pack will
increase consumers’ purchase intention and choice of this product.
Simultaneous Versus Separate Evaluation
People may exhibit different preferences for the same option depending on whether or not
other options are presented simultaneously or not (Bazerman et al., 1992; Hsee, 1996). In joint
evaluation, two (or more) options are presented and evaluated simultaneously, whereas in
separate evaluation, each option is presented and evaluated separately. This is especially
relevant in the current case of oversized volume indications, as consumers may use the size
of other options to infer the amount of extra volume that is provided. If this is the
case, the effects of oversized volume indications may be mitigated when products are
evaluated jointly. Such joint evaluation is common in real life, where consumers often
choose products in the context of other options (e.g., a supermarket shelf containing
multiple products from the same category).
Different explanations for inconsistencies across joint versus separate evaluation have been
proposed in literature, and these include norm theory, the want/should proposition and the
evaluability hypothesis. Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) entails that in different
contexts, individuals refer to different comparison sets. Specifically, when they are presented
with a single item to evaluate, they find it hard to make sense of it and thus evoke a set of
available, internal referents for comparison and evaluation. Instead, when they are presented
with more items to evaluate, the alternatives themselves provide the comparison set for
evaluation (Bazerman et al., 1999). The want/should proposition offered by Bazerman et al.
(1998) relies upon a tension between what consumers want to do versus what they think that
they should do. In a separate evaluation, lacking a counterbalancing alternative, consumers
lean towards what they want to do, while in joint evaluation, consumers tend to select the most
justifiable option (the one that they think they should choose). The evaluability hypothesis
(Bazerman et al., 1992; Hsee, 1996; Hsee, 1998) suggests that preference reversals due to joint
versus separate evaluation are driven by differences in the evaluability of attributes. A hard-to-
evaluate attribute will have less impact in separate evaluation than in joint evaluation, since in
separate evaluation people have difficulty assessing the desirability of an option on the hard-to-
evaluate attribute (Bazerman et al., 1999).
Indications of bonus volume reflect a hard-to-evaluate attribute, as consumers have diffi-
culties in correctly estimating the additional volume that they will obtain. Joint evaluation of
products could be expected to help consumers in assessing the desirability of the option with
additional volume, because it allows them to make a better estimate of the amount of additional
volume that they will receive. In the case of an oversized volume indication, this would imply
that consumers who are presented with multiple similar products at the same time are better
able to assess that the additional volume is relatively small (i.e., smaller than would be
expected based on the oversized volume indication) than consumers who are presented with
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only one option at a time. We expect that this will mitigate the effects of the oversized volume
indication on both volume perceptions and choice:
H3:The effect of the presence (vs. absence) of an oversized volume indication on volume
perceptions will be smaller for joint than for separate evaluation.
H4:The effect of the presence (vs. absence) of an oversized volume indication on
purchase intention and product choice will be smaller for joint than for separate
evaluation.
Methodology
Participants and design of the study
Participants were 312 students of Wageningen University, the Netherlands, who were ran-
domly assigned to a condition in a 3 (packaging design of the product with bonus volume) × 2
(evaluation context: joint vs. separate evaluation) between-subjects factorial design. Three
participants were excluded from the dataset due to multiple missing values, leaving a sample of
309 participants (77.7% female, mean age 21 years). The number of participants required for
the experiment was based on a power calculation, using the statistical programme GPower
(2018). Based on the effect size (0.18) obtained in prior research (Purnhagen & Van Herpen,
2017), an error probability of (0.05) and a power of 1-B (0.80), 301 participants would be
needed.
Participants received two products to evaluate (one product with bonus volume and one
without), either simultaneously (in the joint evaluation condition) or first the bonus product
and then the similarly shaped non-bonus product (in the separate evaluation condi-
tion). We opted for this fixed order of presentation in the separate evaluation
condition to prevent participants from being affected by the non-bonus product in
their evaluation of the bonus product.
Stimuli
Gingerbread was used as stimulus material. The bonus product, which was available on the
market, contained an oversized extra volume indication area. The actual additional volume
provided was 20%, whereas the coloured area on the package that appeared to indicate the
extra volume took up nearly 30% of the package. In line with the prior study on oversized
volume indications, we manipulated the packaging design of the product with bonus volume.
This packaging contained (a) the correct area and percentage (control condition), (b) the
oversized area only or (c) the oversized area plus correct percentage. As a comparison product,
a gingerbread of the same brand without additional volume was taken. This product was
identical in all conditions. Figure 1 provides the different packages that were used.
Procedure
Participants were recruited around campus by means of posters, Facebook posts, and word of
mouth communication. After giving informed consent, in the separate evaluation condition,
participants randomly received one out of the three package conditions and later the
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comparison product. In the joint evaluation condition, participants received both
gingerbreads simultaneously. Products were taken away, and participants subsequently
answered questions about the products.
In the separate evaluation condition, participants first answered questions on the bonus
product (general questions to mask the purpose of the study, followed by questions on volume
perception, inferences of manipulative intent, and purchase intention for the bonus product).
Next, they saw the comparison product and subsequently answered questions on this compar-
ison product (general questions and purchase intention). In the joint evaluation condition,
participants saw both products together. They answered general questions and purchase
intention for bonus product and for comparison product (in that order). Next, they answered
questions on volume perception and inferences of manipulative intent. The questions on
inferences of manipulative intent were included to assess the extent to which participants
were aware of being influenced by the packaging and potential effects on attitudes.
At the end of the survey, all participants reported background questions on demographics
(gender, age, study), consumption and purchase of gingerbread, liking of gingerbread, and
attitudes towards the brand of gingerbread used in this study (6 items, α = .73; based on Lee &
Mason, 1999). Finally, participants could choose to take one of the gingerbreads as reward for
the study, or, alternatively, they could opt for a monetary reward of 1.50 Euro.
Measures
General Questions About the Packaging For both packages, participants rated general
questions on brand familiarity, ease of identifying the product type, comprehension of opening
instructions, ease of comprehending ingredient list, readability of text, liking of packaging
design, and attractiveness of packaging, on 5-point scales ranging from “completely disagree”
to “completely agree.” These questions were included to mask the purpose of the study.
Paired-sample t-tests revealed that the two chosen packages were very comparable. No
significant differences in the general evaluations were found, except for two instances: opening
instructions were considered less easy to comprehend for the bonus pack (M = 4.09) than for
the comparison product (M = 4.30; t(308) = −5.39, p < .001), and overall attractiveness of the
packaging was higher for the bonus pack (M = 3.98) than for the comparison product (M =
Fig. 1 Bonus products (3 packaging design conditions) and comparison product
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3.86; t(308) = 2.34, p = .020). The latter is in line with product attitude, as reported in the
“Results” section.
Volume Perception Participants answered three types of measurements designed to tap into
their perception of the amount of extra volume contained in the bonus packaging (cf.
Purnhagen & Van Herpen, 2017). The first measure concerned a visual estimate of the amount
of extra volume. Participants were asked to indicate the amount of extra volume on a piece of
paper showing the exact contours of the bonus package gingerbread. They could indicate the
amount of extra volume by drawing a horizontal line on the paper. Second, participants rated
their volume perception for the bonus pack, on three items (“this bonus pack of gingerbread
offered a lot of bonus volume,” “this bonus pack of gingerbread is a large pack” and “this
bonus pack of gingerbread was a lot larger than most packs of gingerbread;” α = .64), on a 7-
point scale ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” Third, participants were
asked to give a numerical indication (percentage) of the amount of extra volume they thought
they were given.
Purchase Intention Participants indicated their intention to purchase the products on a three-
item scale (cf. Baker & Churchill Jr, 1977; Bruner II, 2009; α = .78 for bonus pack and α = .80
for comparison product), ranging from “definitely not” to “certainly” (7 points). Items were
“Would you like to try this product,” “Would you buy this product if you happened to see it in
a store” and “Would you actively seek out this product in a store.”
Inferences of Manipulative Intent Inferences of manipulative intent measured using a six-
item scale (cf. Campbell, 1995), on a 7-point rating scale ranging from “completely
disagree” to “completely agree.” Items were “The way in which the packaging tries to
persuade people to buy seems acceptable to me,” “This company tries to manipulate
consumers in ways that I don’t like” (reverse coded), “This packaging was fair in
what was said and shown,” “I think that this packaging is fair,” “I was annoyed by
this packaging because the company seemed to be trying to inappropriately manage or
control the purchase of consumers” (reverse coded) and “I didn’t mind the packaging,
the company tried to persuade consumers without being excessively manipulative” (α
= .84). In addition to examining the full scale, we also separated perceived honesty of
the packaging (third and fourth item from the inferences of manipulative intent scale)
from perceived manipulative intent of the company (remaining items).
Choice At the end of the experiment, participants were given a choice between the ginger-
bread with bonus volume, the alternative gingerbread (i.e., the comparison product) or
a small monetary reward. They received their choice as a token of appreciation for
participating. By letting participants pay for the gingerbread by foregoing reward for
their participation, we ensured an incentive-compatible choice. This measures the
transactional decision that the participant makes.
Analyses
One-sample t-tests were used to examine if participants in each of the conditions
significantly overestimated the bonus volume, compared to the actual bonus volume
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(5 cm). Next, a factorial ANOVA (analysis of variance) was used to further analyse data
on volume perception, with the different packaging conditions and evaluation context
as independent variables. When a significant effect for packaging condition was
found, post hoc tests (LSD) were used to compare means. The histogram of volume
estimates in percentages showed various peaks, and we decided to split this variable
into three categories (underestimation, correct estimation, and overestimation) and test
the association with packaging condition using a chi-square test.
Purchase intention was asked for both bonus product and comparison product and
analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with type of product (bonus vs. compar-
ison) as within subjects factor, and packaging condition and evaluation context as
between-subjects factors. Inferences of manipulative intent were analysed using facto-
rial ANOVA, using both the full scale and the two subscales as dependent variables.
Furthermore, multinomial regressions were run with choice as dependent variable, to
predict choice from package condition and evaluation context.
Results
Background Information
Most participants (80%) liked gingerbread. Consumption frequency was low, though, with
27% of participants eating gingerbread “reasonably often” to “very often.” Most participants
(69%) bought gingerbread less than once per month. Attitude towards the brand used in this
study was positive (M = 4.60 on a 7-point scale).
Volume Perception
To assess whether participants overestimated the bonus volume, we tested the volume
perceptions in centimetres against the correct area size (5 cm). As the packaging is sealed at
the end, and the coloured area extends beyond the actual gingerbread to accommodate for this,
we tested the robustness of our results by also checking effects against 4 and 6 cm. In all cases
and conditions, we found evidence of overestimation. Hence, in all conditions, participants
significantly overestimated the amount of bonus volume (all ts (52) > 8.46, ps < .001). Table 1
provides means and standard deviations. Next, we examined whether the extent of overesti-
mation depended on packaging condition or evaluation context.
An ANOVA revealed that packaging condition significantly influenced the volume percep-
tions for the bonus volume that participants indicated in the drawing (in centimetres) (F(2,
303) = 21.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .13). Participants who saw a bonus pack with the correct area and
percentage gave a significantly lower estimate of the bonus volume (M = 7.30), then
participants who saw a bonus pack with oversized area only (M = 8.88, p < .001) and then
participants who saw a bonus pack with oversized area and correct percentage (M = 8.70, p <
.001). Volume perceptions did not differ significantly between the latter two conditions (p =
.488). This implies that the size of the coloured area affected the volume estimates, in support
of our first hypothesis, and that adding a correct percentage did not change these perceptions.
The ANOVA furthermore showed that evaluation context (F(1, 303) = 0.38, p = .537) and the
interaction between packaging condition and evaluation context (F(2, 303) = 0.78, p = .459)
did not significantly affect volume perceptions. This implies that we do not find support for
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hypothesis 3. In a joint evaluation, with a comparison product present, participants provided
similar volume estimates as in separate evaluation.
Participants also indicated the perceived additional volume in percentage. Estimates ranged
between 0 and 50%, and almost half of the participants gave the correct percentage of 20%.
Because the distribution of the estimated volume percentages showed a high peak at the correct
percentage, we split the estimates into “underestimation” (< 20%), “correct estimation” (20%)
and “overestimation” (> 20%). These estimations differed across packaging conditions (χ2(4) =
15.75, p = .003). In the condition with the correct area and percentage where indicated, 52% of
participants gave a correct estimation, and only 16% overestimated and 32% underestimated.
Yet, when the oversized area was usedwith the correct percentage, more participants (25%) gave
an overestimation. In this condition, 59% gave a correct estimate and 16% gave an underesti-
mation. Both overestimation and underestimation were high among participants in the condition
with only the oversized area. In that condition, 38% gave the correct estimate, whereas 29%
overestimated and 33% underestimated. These results show that even in conditions where the
correct percentage was provided on the packaging, many participants were unable to report it.
Further analyses showed that evaluation context did not have a significant effect on the extent to
which participants correctly estimated the percentage.
Additionally, participants reported volume perceptions on a rating scale. Table 1 provides
means and standard deviations. An ANOVA shows a significant main effect of packaging (F(2,
303) = 3.50, p = .031, ηp2 = .02). Post hoc tests revealed that volume estimates were higher for
participants who saw the oversized area plus percentage (M = 5.64) than for participants who
saw the correct area plus percentage (M = 5.35, p = .009), in partial support of hypothesis 1.
Other differences between packaging conditions were not significant. There was also a
marginal effect of evaluation context (F(2, 303) = 3.12, p = .078, ηp2 = .01), with people
tending to give higher volume estimates in separate evaluation (M = 5.57) than in joint
evaluation (M = 5.41). The interaction effect between packaging and evaluation context was
not significant (F(2, 303) = 0.12, p = .884). We thus found no support for hypothesis 3.
Purchase Intention
The repeated measures ANOVA for purchase intention showed a significant main effect for
evaluation context (F(1, 303) = 7.38, p = .007, ηp2 = .02), which is qualified by a significant
interaction between type of product and evaluation context (F(1, 303) = 4.97, p = .027, ηp2 = .02).
Table 1 Means and standard deviation for volume perception and purchase intention





Correct area and correct %
Separate evaluation 53 7.21 (1.90) 5.40 (0.86) 3.67 (1.29) 3.86 (1.31)
Joint evaluation 50 7.41 (1.87) 5.29 (0.87) 4.43 (1.02) 4.19 (1.11)
Oversized area only
Separate evaluation 53 9.10 (1.56) 5.56 (0.67) 3.86 (1.11) 3.97 (1.26)
Joint evaluation 53 8.66 (1.85) 5.42 (0.86) 4.02 (1.30) 3.87 (1.28)
Oversized area and correct %
Separate evaluation 50 8.78 (1.90) 5.75 (0.74) 3.81 (1.18) 3.97 (1.24)
Joint evaluation 50 8.62 (2.12) 5.53 (0.68) 4.30 (1.14) 4.39 (1.18)
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None of the other main effects and interactions was significant. Means and standard deviations
are provided in Table 1. Examining these results further in separate ANOVAS for bonus pack and
comparison product, we found that the evaluation context had a significant effect on the
evaluation of the bonus pack (F(1, 303) = 12.06, p = .001, ηp2 = .04), but not on the evaluation
of the comparison product (F(1, 303) = 2.34, p = .127). It thus appears that, in line with our
reasoning, the presence of a comparable product affects participants’ evaluation of a bonus pack,
while the evaluation of the comparison product remains stable across conditions. Surprisingly,
purchase intentions for the bonus pack were higher in joint evaluation (M = 4.24) than in separate
evaluation (M = 3.78). Apparently, the evaluation context made the presence of bonus volume
more salient.
To check whether volume perceptions mediated (i.e., were the underlying process for) effects
of packaging condition on purchase intentions, we estimated amoderatedmediationmodel using
the PROCESSmacro in SPSS (model 7; Hayes, 2017). In this analysis, packaging condition was
entered as a categorical independent variable using effect coding, perceived volume perception
(in centimetre) was the mediator, evaluation context was the moderator, and the difference score
between purchase intentions for bonus product and comparison product was the dependent
variable. Results showed that none of the indirect effects was significant (all confidence intervals
included 0), indicating the volume perceptions were not the mediating process.
The overall higher purchase intention for bonus packs in joint than in separation evaluation
(regardless of volume indications) can occur because participants realized that the indicated
bonus area was (in some conditions) oversized but preferred the product nonetheless as it
contained extra volume, or because participants did not realize that the bonus area was
oversized. To investigate this further, we analysed effects on inferences of manipulative intent.
Inferences of Manipulative Intent
An ANOVA with inferences of manipulative intent (full scale) as dependent variable showed that
none of the effects was significant (packaging condition: F(2, 303) = 0.35, p = .703; evaluation
context: F(1, 303) = 0.003, p = .955; interaction between these: F(2, 303) = 0.12, p = .889).
Yet, examining the subscale on perceived honesty of the packaging, a significant main effect
of packaging was found (F(2, 303) = 3.01, p = .051, ηp2 = .02). Participants who saw the
packaging with oversized area found this to be less honest (M = 4.58) than participants who
saw the packaging with correct area and percentage (M = 4.96). The effects of evaluation
context and the interaction were not significant. For the subscale on perceived manipulative
intent of the company, none of the effects was significant. Thus, participants appeared aware
that the packaging with oversized volume indication was less honest, but they did not seem to
consider this manipulative.
Choice
Participants were given a choice between the bonus pack, the comparison product and cash
(€1.50) at the end of the study. Figure 2 shows the percentage of participants choosing each of
these options in the various conditions. Overall, none of the options is preferred significantly
more than the others (χ2(2) = .718, p = .698). To test whether choice for the bonus pack is higher
depending on packaging condition or evaluation context, we applied a multinomial regression.
According to the multinomial regression model, the choice for bonus pack (with “choice for
comparison product” as reference category) was not significantly affected by evaluation
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context, packaging condition or their interaction (ps > .05), although the interaction effect
between an oversized area (with “correct area and correct percentage” as reference category)
and evaluation context was close to significance (β = −1.30, χ2(1) = 3.62, p = .057). The
McFadden pseudo R-square was low (.026), indicating small effect size, and effects of
packaging condition were not significant when we examined choices separately for the two
evaluation contexts. This means that we find very little statistical evidence to support that
choices are affected by packaging condition and evaluation context, and that the effect size of
such a possible effect appears to be very small. The pattern of results is opposite to what we
found for purchase intention, with participants being more inclined to choose a bonus pack
with oversized area under separate evaluation than under joint evaluation. Mediation analyses
(again using PROCESS, model 7) furthermore showed no significant indirect effects of
volume estimates in the relation between packaging condition and choice of bonus pack
(entered as a dichotomous dependent variable).
Discussion
In this study, we have tested the effects of oversized volume indications on the transactional
decision of consumers in two types of evaluation contexts, namely separate and simultaneous.
Our results contribute to previous findings about consumer deception. Specifically, we have
shown that the oversized bonus area leads consumers to overestimate the bonus volume, under
all conditions of the study. Hence, such bonus packs generally deceive consumers. These
results parallel findings of previous research on bonus packs (Purnhagen & Van Herpen,
2017). People thus tend to overestimate the size of the bonus volume in general, regardless of
context. Even adding the correct percentage clearly on the front-of-pack does not mitigate this
general effect, according to the current results. Many participants could not recollect the
percentage that was indicated, underlining the high relative salience of the visual area in
comparison to the low salience of the percentage itself.
When it comes to purchase intentions, people rated the bonus pack higher when in joint
evaluation compared to separate evaluation. Thus, participants had a higher intention to buy the
Fig. 2 Percentage choice for the options, depending on packaging and evaluation context
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bonus product in a competitive setting with other products than when evaluating it alone. For this
effect to occur, it was irrelevant whether it contained an oversized area or the correct area. The
availability of a comparison product appears to have made the extra volume salient. Yet, when it
came to the actual transactional decision (choice), participants tended to be relatively less likely
to choose the bonus pack than the comparison product in joint evaluation, and relatively more
likely to choose the bonus package than the comparison product in separate evaluation (although
this effect did not reach statistical significance). This result is opposite to what we observedwhen
measuring purchase intention. Result patterns for purchase intention and choice are not in line,
which is an interesting result. It illustrates that to assess actual transactional value, looking only at
purchase intention may not suffice, as results for purchase intention and choice may not align.
Future studies might rely on more empirical evidence by using a different measurement to test
purchase behaviour. For example, studies could ask participants to pay out of pocket (a realistic
price) for the gingerbread, rather than foregoing a monetary reward.
Testing whether consumers know that they are persuaded by the bonus pack, the results
indicate that they indeed realize that the packaging with oversized area is dishonest, but do not
find this serious enough to affect their evaluation of the company as manipulative. This
suggests that consumers may not find bonus packs with oversized areas especially trouble-
some. Yet, our dataset cannot draw definite conclusions as to this effect, and this could be
something to explore in more depth in future research.
Article 6 (1) UCPD requires to test whether the deceptiveness “causes or is likely to cause [the
consumer] to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.” In a
competitive choice setting, a significant number of consumers intended to purchase the product
indicating a bonus, regardless of whether it was correctly sized or not. Hence, it seems that it is
not the deceptiveness of the bonus packs as such, which leads consumers to intend purchasing
the product. Rather, the fact that there is a bonus volume seems to have an effect on purchase
intention. This lies in line with the result of the data on inferences of manipulative intent, which
indicate that consumers simply may not care if the package is deceiving or not. From these
results alone, one could not draw the conclusion that the bonus pack’s deceptiveness has an
influence on consumers’ transactional decision in the way Art. 6 (1) UCPD requires. If one adds
the results from the outcome of the study on choice, consumers were less likely to choose for the
bonus volume in a competitive choice setting. Hence, in competitive choice settings (which
should present the majority of consumer’s shopping experiences), we could not produce
empirical evidence that the deceptiveness “causes or is likely to cause (… the consumer) to take
a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.”
A possible explanation could be that in competitive choice settings, the bonus volume may be
perceived as a distinct benefit compared to the other product, and a lost opportunity if not chosen.
Previous research has shown that consumers are especially attracted to sales promotions that are
limited in time, and that they will accelerate purchases for these types of promotions (Aggarwal &
Vaidyanathan, 2003). In our case, consumers may feel that if they do not take the bonus pack, they
may not be able to reap the benefits the bonus pack volume may provide to them over the other
product. For such intention, it matters less how large the benefit is exactly, it suffices that there is a
bonus option over the other product. This potential process is not able to explain, however, why
choice of the bonus pack tended to be lower in joint evaluation compared to separate evaluation.
In separate evaluation, consumers seem to have less intention to purchase a product with an
oversized bonus area compared to a competitive choice setting. However, their actual choice of
the product is relatively high, albeit not significantly different from the other packaging
conditions in our study. In such settings, the deceptiveness does not seem to carry through
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to choice. In sum, according to our study, the deceiving effect of bonus packs does not have an
effect on the transactional decision of consumers.
To sum up, these results support and extend the findings of the study from Purnhagen and
van Herpen (2017) by showing that oversize extra volume indication area influences con-
sumers’ volume perceptions. Yet, although consumers seemed to be deceived, this seemed not
to have a clear influence on the transactional decision of consumers.
Limitations and Future Research
A limitation of our study is that it took place in a lab environment rather than a real-life
environment, such as a supermarket or other retail environment. In a real-life environment, a
large assortment of alternative products will be offered (rather than one competing product),
and more distraction is present. Moreover, these competing products could be differently
packaged, making direct comparisons of bonus volume more cumbersome for consumers.
What the current study indicates is that such contextual factors could influence the extent to
which the transactional decision of consumers is affected.
Our experimental setup also implies that the choices of participants are made in a somewhat
artificial context. We took precautions to ensure that choices are incentive-compatible and
resemble actual purchases as closely as possible. Participants had to give up a monetary reward
for participation to receive the product. Yet, this situation is not identical to purchase decisions
made in a supermarket, and future research could examine more natural contexts.
Future research could also focus on using alternative measures for choice, such as letting
participants pay out of pocket or using actual sales data, to test if our pattern of results for
choice is robust. Our current findings suggest that future research may want to focus on the
effects of an oversized volume indication for products or situations in which no comparison
product is readily available. This could for instance be products with a package shape that is
different from competing products, so that the size of additional volume is difficult to ascertain,
or online shopping situations in which the pictorial representation of the products complicates
direct comparison of product size. Our results indicate that a potential increase in choice due to
deception is most likely to occur under these conditions, if at all.
Finally, the use of alternative methods to examine the case of oversized volume indications
could supplement the current findings and provide a deeper understanding. For instance,
qualitative in-depth interviews or focus groups could be used to gain more insight into
consumer responses. This could answer questions such as to what extend consumers are aware
of the oversized area indications, what their main concerns are, and what type of reactions occur
once consumers become aware of the deception. Moreover, quantitative analyses of sales data
from products that temporarily contain oversized versus correct-sized volume indications on
pack could provide an indication of the size of potential effects on sales volumes. Such analyses
would need to control for many factors that could simultaneously affect sales volumes, such as
advertisements for the bonus product, competitive reactions, and seasonal patterns.
Implications
Our study has several important theoretical and practical implications. The differences that we
found between stated purchase intention and actual product choice imply that studies based on
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purchase intention may not provide the needed insights to determine whether transactional
decisions of consumers will be affected. Therefore, research that sets out to examine such
transactional decisions should include measures of actual choice.
Another implication from our research relates to the measurement of extra volume percep-
tions. Our results indicate that some measures are more sensitive than others, in picking up
differences in perceptions. We recommend the use of the volume perception measure in
centimetres and the item scale since these appear to be the most sensitive in picking up
differences in consumer perceptions among the different package conditions.
As previously mentioned, our research emphasizes the necessity and potential of incorpo-
rating behavioural studies in EU legislation and adjudication, specifically in the area of unfair
commercial practices. It is thus of relevance to consumers, current European legislation, judges
and marketers for several reasons. It is relevant to consumers because of the potential
misleading practice they can fall victim to. When they overestimate the actual extra volume
of a product due to the oversized volume indication section on the package and thereby end up
buying this product, they get less value than expected. This, according to the Court, can make a
commercial practice misleading (Art. 7 UCPD), from which they should be protected. In this
respect, we found very little statistical evidence to support that choices are affected by
packaging condition and evaluation context, and the effect size of such a possible effect
appears to be very small. These insights have implications for the Court of Justice of the
European Union since it could alter its future interpretation concerning volume indications on
packages.
Conclusions
Research in the field of behavioural sciences has provided valuable insights into how
consumers’ behaviour can deviate from the expected rational standard, revealing their
systemically limited processing capacities. These findings can be used to improve the
interpretation of the average consumer benchmark as a basis for unfair commercial
practice law. In this regard, we find that consumer perceptions are affected by visually
salient volume indications. The question, however, is whether these altered percep-
tions lead to changes in consumers’ transactional decision. This could then, conse-
quently, be used as input to determine an unfair commercial practice (Art. 7 UCPD).
Our results indicate that transactional decisions appear relatively unaffected, especially
when evaluating such a bonus pack jointly with a comparison product.
Although consumer protection levels are still to be determined at Member State
level, following the claim established by Schebesta and Purnhagen (2017), systematic
deviations could be addressed at Union level, taking into account the insights of
behavioural sciences to determine a more accurate and realistic average consumer
benchmark. Whether such insight will be used to inform regulation, law-making and/
or legal interpretation depends to a large extent on the weight that actors will give to
them in order to protect consumers against other factors, such as the provision of the
principle of free movement of goods, when exercising their discretion or interpreting
the law. In this respect, the Mars case concerned free movement of goods, and at the
time it was decided, neither the FIC nor the UCPD had entered into force. General
remarks regarding whether this case should have been decided differently are difficult
to make. Making such normative legal recommendations based on empirical evidence
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shall generally be done with care, as empirical evidence shall be considered only one
of the aspects in judicial decision-making, and only as far as findings are generaliz-
able and applicable to the concrete case and the concrete law at hand (Purnhagen,
2018; Zeiler, 2010). In conclusion, behavioural studies can provide relevant insights
for Courts and regulators about the effects of commercial practices on consumer
perceptions. While it is far from clear whether and at what level (Member State or
EU) the current consumer benchmark requires the incorporation of behavioural science
under EU law, it does not automatically preclude it.
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